Security assistance in Africa: the case for more by Harkness, Kristen
AbstrAct: This article argues that political tampering with military 
recruitment and promotion practices, especially the construction 
and dismantling of  ethnically based armies, has led African militar-
ies to intervene in politics in order to block or reverse democratiza-
tion efforts. The entrenchment of  politically insulated, merit-based 
military institutions is thus necessary to deepen democracy in Africa. 
The United States can assist by offering protection, training, and fi-
nancial incentives to encourage reform.
Promoting peace and security in Africa through the establishment of  democratic institutions and good governance has been pri-oritized by the Obama administration as a key US foreign policy 
concern.1 Weak and failed states threaten national security because they 
“attract destabilizing forces.” Unable to control their borders or police 
their territory internally, such states provide breeding grounds and transit 
routes for terrorist organizations, drug cartels, weapons traffickers, and 
other criminal networks.2 For example, poor governance and rampant 
conflict in northern Nigeria and Somalia have given rise to two of  the 
continent’s most dangerous terrorist organizations, Boko Haram and 
al Shabaab, while persistent political instability and poverty in Guinea 
Bissau have led that country to become an international hub for drug 
trafficking.
Democracy is seen as a long-term solution to this threat because 
democratic institutions remove many of the underlying causes of state 
weakness. Democracy creates peaceful channels for resolving social 
conflict, alleviating incentives for domestic strife. Democracies are more 
politically inclusive, remedying the systemic exclusion of ethnic groups 
from political power; this kind of exclusion is a known driver of insur-
gency, as often occurred at the hands of autocratic rulers.3 Democracy is 
also associated with the rule of law, which both dampens popular griev-
ances and provides a stable context for investment, entrepreneurship, 
1      Johnnie Carson, “US-Africa Policy Under the Obama Administration (Remarks to the 
Harvard University Africa Focus Program),” April 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/
rm/2010/139462.htm.
2      US Department of  the Army, Stability Operations, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: US 
Department of  the Army, 2008), 1:11; and US Department of  State, Conflict Prevention and Crisis 
Response: Responding to Emerging Instability Overseas, June 21, 2013, http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/211773.pdf.
3      Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? 
New Data and Analysis,” World Politics 62, no. 1 (January 2010): 87-119; Philip Roessler, “The Enemy 
Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa,” World Politics 62, no. 2 (April 2011): 300-346; 
and Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: 
A Configurational Analysis of  a New Global Data Set,” American Sociological Review 74, no. 2 (April 
2009): 316-337.
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and other determinants of economic growth, thereby raising populations 
out of poverty. Strengthening democratic institutions and protecting 
democratic gains have thus become core principles of both US policy 
toward Africa and the strategic approach adopted by Africa Command 
(AFRICOM).4
Yet, democracy is in decline. Larry Diamond argues that since 
the turn of the 21st century, “there has been a significant and, in fact, 
accelerating rate of democratic breakdown” with at least 25 democra-
cies having collapsed since 2000—a failure rate of 17.6 percent.5 Africa, 
in particular, has struggled deeply with democratization. Despite the 
passing of over 20 years since most African countries took their “indis-
pensable first steps” toward liberalization and adopting competitive 
elections, the latest Freedom House reports indicate that recent setbacks 
have left only 12 percent of the continent free today.6 Of Diamond’s col-
lapsed democracies, 32 percent are in Africa, suggesting the continent 
contributes significantly to global trends of increasing authoritarianism.7 
Even Botswana, long considered a bulwark of democracy in Africa, has 
recently suffered government harassment of opposition candidates, 
interference with media reporting, and abuse of state resources during 
campaigning.8
The continued absence of democracy in many African countries, 
and the loss of democratic institutions in others, threatens continued 
instability and conflict in a region already rife with the problems gener-
ated by weak states. For US policymakers and AFRICOM to reverse 
this trend, a deeper understanding of Africa’s struggle to democratize 
is necessary. This article hopes to contribute to such an understanding 
by focusing on the role of African militaries in blocking or reversing 
democratization efforts. It then proposes a number of policy interven-
tions that may help reform these institutions to be more compatible with 
democracy.
Political Tampering, Ethnic Armies, and Military Intervention 
against Democracies
While many roads can lead to democratic reversals, from the gradual 
extension of executive power to the erosion of civil liberties that may 
accompany prolonged counterinsurgency efforts, direct military inter-
vention has been an important contributor to this regretful outcome. 
When dissatisfied with democratic politics, militaries have prevented 
the implementation of free and fair elections, tampered with balloting, 
engaged in voter intimidation, overturned election results, and deposed 
4      Carson, “US-Africa Policy Under the Obama Administration,” and Carter Ham, Senate Armed 
Services Committee Statement of  General Carter Ham, USA Commander, United States Africa Command, 
March 7, 2013, 6, www.africom.mil/Doc/10432.
5      Larry Diamond, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” Journal of  Democracy 26, no. 1 
(January 2015): 144. See also Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 
(March-April 2008). 
6      Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 10; and Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2015,” https://
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015.
7      Diamond, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” 145. See table “Breakdowns of  
Democracy, 2000-2014.” 
8      Amy R. Poteete, “Botswana: Democracy Derailed? Botswana’s Fading Halo,” AfricaPlus, October 20, 
2014, https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2014/11/03/botswana-democracy-on-course-or-derailing.
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newly elected civilian leaders. Indeed, in Africa, coups have quickly fol-
lowed nearly 40 percent of electoral transfers of power—when one leader 
peacefully hands over executive power to the next via the ballot box, a 
critical cornerstone of democratic politics.9 Since 2010 alone, coups have 
been attempted against the elected civilian governments of Burundi 
(2015), Guinea (2011), Guinea-Bissau (2010 & 2012), Madagascar (2010), 
Mali (2012), Mauritania (2008), and Niger (2010). African militaries thus 
share much of the responsibility for Africa’s difficulties in sustaining 
democratization. As Bratton and van de Walle have argued, where mili-
taries have opposed democracy, liberalization has stalled or failed.10
Political tampering with military recruitment, retention, and promo-
tion practices plays a crucial role in understanding why African militaries 
have been so predisposed to intervening against elected governments. 
First, most African countries have no tradition of insulating militaries 
from direct interference by the chief executive. Highly institutionalized 
and independent judicial and legislative branches of government are rare 
in fledgling democracies. So too are well developed and functioning 
ministries of defense that can provide legal-bureaucratic and impersonal 
civilian control over the military. Absent these institutions, few checks 
and balances exist on the ability of presidents to appoint and dismiss 
military officers based on their personal whims. When social conflict 
arises over controversial elections or other common problems of newly 
established democratic institutions, military officers whose political 
loyalty comes under question then face the real potential of dismissal or 
demotion. They may preempt this possibility, or take revenge in its after-
math, by intervening in politics: seizing power themselves or throwing 
their support behind the opposition. 
The recent coup in Burundi is a case in point. In early 2015, 
President Pierre Nkurunziza sought advice from members of his inner 
circle on seeking a third term in office, including from Major General 
Godefroid Niyombare—an old ally, fellow former Hutu rebel fighter 
in Burundi’s civil war, and recently named director of national intel-
ligence. Niyombare expressed his concerns with violating the terms of 
the peace agreement and the constitution, which limit presidents to two 
terms, and advised Nkurunziza not to run again. He was then summar-
ily dismissed as the national intelligence director (although he remained 
in the army). A few months later, mass social protests erupted after 
the president publicly indicated his intentions to run in the upcoming 
elections. Within weeks, on May 13, Niyombare resurfaced to lead a 
coup attempt against his former ally. Although the coup was quickly 
put down, it represents a significant failure of the extensive training by 
the United States and others to promote political neutrality within the 
Burundi military. Unchecked, personal control over high-level military 
appointments directly contributed to this re-politicization of the army.11
9      Kristen A. Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coups Traps and the 
Difficulties of  Democratization in Africa,” Journal of  Conflict Resolution (2014 Forthcoming): 17.
10      Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 211-216.
11      David Blair, “Burundi Shares Ethnic Balance that Led to Rwanda Genocide—But This 
Conflict Is Different,” The Telegraph, May 14, 2015; “Burundi: What Is Behind the Coup Bid?,” BBC, 
May 15, 2015; Patrick Nduwimana and Goran Tomasevic, “President Returns to Burundi after Army 
Says Coup Bid Failed,” Reuters, May 14, 2015; Morgan Winsor, “Who Is Godefroid Niyombare? 
Meet the Burundi Army General Who Declared a Coup to Oust President Pierre Nkurunziza,” 
International Business Times, May 13, 2015.
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Second, Africa is historically burdened by a particularly insidious 
form of political tampering: ethnically recruited military organizations 
that foster loyalty through shared identity, or ethnic armies.12 This tradi-
tion began under colonialism. Colonial armies relied on racially white 
soldiers, largely drawn from the European metropole, to officer far-
flung forces while recruiting natives into the rank-and-file. Martial race 
doctrine stipulated these local recruits should be drawn from politically 
reliable ethnic groups with great military prowess.13 Groups like the 
Kalenjiin in Kenya, the Acholi in Uganda, and the Mossi in Burkina 
Faso thus came to dominate their respective colonial militaries.14 
Although decolonization brought opportunities for change, many 
African countries continued to build ethnic armies post-indepen-
dence. The late 1950s and early 1960s was a period of great regional 
instability: Ghana suffered ethnically-based political party violence; 
Congo-Brazaville experienced urban riots that fell along tribal lines; 
Rwanda saw deadly pogroms after the Hutu revolution unseated the 
Tutsi monarchy; Sudan erupted into civil war; and the Congo state com-
pletely collapsed after widespread army mutinies.15 As insecurity spread, 
leaders searched for effective ways to ensure military loyalty, and many 
turned to the colonial model of recruiting politically loyal ethnic kin. 
Some such ethnic armies were built with the collusion of departing colo-
nial powers, such as the Fulani/Peuhl dominated military of Cameroon 
and the Hutu based army of Rwanda.16 Others were constructed through 
violent processes of purging, such as occurred in Sierra Leone until all 
groups except the Limba had been removed from both the police and 
armed forces.17 Still others came about when ethnically based rebel 
forces captured central power, as the Tutsi dominated Rwanda Patriotic 
Front (RPF) did in 1994. In these ways, many contemporary African 
states inherited a tradition of ethnically based security institutions.18
Democracy deeply threatens such ethnic armies because elections 
may bring to power new leaders who no longer share in their identity. 
Africa is highly diverse, with the majority of countries boasting dozens 
if not hundreds of ethnic groups. Democratic elections thus carry with 
them a high likelihood that power will rotate between leaders of distinct 
ethnic backgrounds. Where new leaders inherit an ethnic army whose 
12      Cynthia Enloe, “The Military Uses of  Ethnicity,” Millennium 4, no. 3 (Winter 1975): 220-233; 
Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Athens: University of  Georgia Press, 
1980); Boubacar N’Diaye, The Challenge of  Institutionalizing Civilian Control: Botswana, Ivory Coast, and 
Kenya in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2001). 
13      J. Bayo Adekson, “Ethnicity and Army Recruitment in Colonial Plural Societies,” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 2, no. 2 (April 1979): 154.
14      Ibid., 160; and John Keegan, World Armies (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983), 598-600; 
Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of  Colonial Military Service in the Kings 
African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999), 58.
15      Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, Nationalism and New States in Africa (London: Heinemann, 
1984), 59; Rene Gauze, The Politics of  Congo-Brazzavilee (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 
1973), 65-66; Catherine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the Politics of  History in Rwanda,” Africa Today 
45, no. 1 (January-March 1998): 13; and Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and 
Independence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 315-317.
16      Minorities at Risk Project, “Minorities at Risk Dataset,” http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/
mar_data.asp; and Patrick Lefèvre and Jean-Nöel Lefèvre, Les Militaire Belge et le Rwanda, 1916-2006 
(Brussels: Racine, 2006), 11-12.
17      Thomas S. Cox, Civil Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of  African Soldiers in Politics 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 106-107. 
18      See also Enloe, “The Military Uses of  Ethnicity,” and Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in 
Divided Societies.
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identity is different than their own, they possess strong incentives to 
restructure that army: to either diversify it to more appropriately match 
the multiethnic character of their societies or to dismantle it and rebuild 
a new army of their coethnics in its place. Either type of restructuring 
threatens the existing ethnic army’s exclusive access to an important 
source of state power, prestige, and patronage. To protect their privileged 
position, they may block democratization efforts from gaining traction, 
interfere with free and fair elections, overturn or otherwise invalidate 
results, or seize power before or after the new leader takes office.
Consider Guinea-Bissau, a small West African country whose insta-
bility and poverty have resulted in its transformation into a central hub 
of cocaine trafficking to Europe and heroin trafficking to the United 
States.19 Protracted fighting with the Portuguese army for independence 
fractured Guinea-Bissau’s ethnic groups, with the rebel army recruit-
ing primarily from the Balanta while the Portuguese managed to keep 
the loyalty of the Fula and Mandinga. Rebel victory and the collapse 
of Portuguese colonialism in the mid-1970s thus led to the immediate 
establishment of a Balanta-dominated armed forces.20 Early nationalist 
leaders attempted to restructure this army along more multiethnic lines, 
to no avail. Both the first and second administrations, led respectively 
by Presidents Luis Cabral and João Bernardo Vieira, faced numerous 
coup attempts from the Balanta military and were eventually deposed.21 
Despite an aborted turn toward democracy in the late 1990s, no govern-
ment has yet been able to diversify the military.
In 2012, steps toward democratization were once again attempted—
and quickly halted by the military. By this time, the Balanta-dominated 
army was thought to have become heavily invested in the drug trade, 
combining ethnic control over the security sector with access to millions 
of dollars in illicit trade.22 The Presidential race had narrowed to a field of 
two candidates, Carlos Gomes and former president Kumba Yala, with a 
run-off election scheduled for late April. Gomes, the clear front runner 
and an ethnic outsider to the military (Yala shares Balanta ethnicity), 
then publicly expressed his intentions of reforming the armed forces. 
Claiming that Gomes had signed a secret document authorizing foreign 
intervention to restructure the military, army officers seized power and 
cancelled the election.23 While they eventually handed power back over 
to civilians in 2014, no president in Guinea Bissau has yet served his full 
term. Were the current government to challenge the military or attempt 
reform, it would likely be overthrown as well.
Guinea-Bissau is not unique in confronting the challenges of building 
democratic institutions while encountering the resistance of ethnically 
based security institutions. Ethnic armies have existed in slightly under 
half of all electoral power transfers in Africa and, when confronted 
with a new leader of a different ethnic identity, have overturned those 
19      Raggie Johansen, “Guinea-Bissau: A New Hub for Cocaine Trafficking,” Perspectives 5 (May 
2008): 4-7; and Ed Vulliamy, “How a Tiny West African Country Became the World’s First Narco-
State,” The Guardian, March 9, 2008.
20      Keegan, World Armies, 239-240.
21      Patrick Chabal, A History of  Postcolonial Lusophone Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2002), 251-258.
22      Vulliamy, “How a Tiny West African Country Became the World’s First Narco-State.”
23      “Guinea-Bissau’s Coup: Besieged in Bissau,” The Economist, April 17, 2012; and “‘Gunfire 
Heard’ in Guinea-Bissau Capital,” BBC, April 12, 2012.
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elections by seizing power fully 75 percent of the time.24 For example, 
in Nigeria, the northern Hausa/Fulani had long dominated the officer 
corps during the country’s many years of military rule. Early democrati-
zation efforts came to a stand still when, in 1993, the military annulled 
election results that would have placed Moshood Abiola, a southern 
Yoruba, in the presidency.25 Elections were not held again for another 
six years while the military continued to govern. In Cameroon, indepen-
dence era leader Ahmadou Ahidjo, with French collaboration, built a 
northern Fulani/Peuhl dominated military.26 After Ahidjo’s retirement, 
Paul Biya, a Christian southerner and ethnic Bulu, won election to the 
presidency. He then immediately announced plans to transfer Fulani/
Peuhl soldiers out of the elite Presidential Guard, sparking a coup 
attempt.27 Biya survived the coup and, in its aftermath, restructured 
the military around his own ethnic group—a situation that remains of 
grave concern today.28 Kenya too has a history of its presidents stacking 
military institutions with coethnics: the Kikuyu dominated the army 
under Jomo Kenyatta and the Kalenjin under Daniel arap Moi. Indeed, 
Moi’s restructuring led to Kenya’s only coup attempt orchestrated by 
disenfranchised Kikuyu officers.29 After Mwai Kibaki came to power 
in 2002, he once again purged the higher ranks of the security services, 
replacing Kalenjin officers with mostly those of the Kikuyu and closely 
related Embu and Meru ethnic groups.30 While the military refrained 
from intervention during this particular transition, the danger remains 
that the future election of a non-Kikuyu would severely test the political 
neutrality of the Kenya Defense Forces.
The presence of ethnically recruited military organizations may 
also have more subtle, yet still insidious, effects on young democracies. 
Possessing an ethnically narrow army loyal through ties of ethnic affin-
ity and patronage may embolden state leaders to disregard the desires 
and rights of much of their population. They may ignore legislative laws 
and judicial rulings, intimidate voters from different ethnic groups, and 
otherwise expand their power beyond constitutional limits. Whether 
direct or indirect, these effects are pernicious for democracy.
Additionally, leaders of fragile democracies facing social unrest may 
be tempted to undo past restructuring and, using their ability to politi-
cally tamper with military recruitment, return to historical precedents 
of ensuring loyalty through ethnicity. Since the 1990s, peace agreements 
and constitutional reforms have diversified many of Africa’s militaries, 
24      Harkness, “The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coups Traps and the Difficulties of  
Democratization in Africa,” 18.
25      Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 216.
26      Minorities at Risk Project, “Minorities at Risk Dataset.”
27      “Attempted Coup—Political Changes—Budget,” Keesings World New Archive 30 (September 
1984): 33075.
28      Minorities at Risk Project, “Minorities at Risk Dataset.”
29      N’Diaye, The Challenge of  Institutionalizing Civilian Control, 123-131.
30      Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2013), 
712-713.
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including in Benin, Sierra Leone, and South Africa.31 Attempts to 
dismantle these ethnically diverse armies could once again motivate 
targeted soldiers to defend themselves by intervening in politics. Such is 
the fear at this very moment in Burundi. Under the peace agreement that 
ended Burundi’s civil war, the army was split equally between Hutu and 
Tutsi soldiers, creating a diverse army. Yet, ethnic divisions remained, 
with former Hutu rebels largely politically aligned with the ruling party 
and former Tutsi soldiers of the old state army sympathizing with the 
opposition. Although the May coup attempt was not itself ethnically 
motivated—it was led by a Hutu, against a Hutu president, and put down 
by loyalists under the Hutu army chief of staff—Nkurunziza’s reaction 
to the coup has nonetheless disproportionately targeted Tutsi soldiers 
(possibly due to their suspected political loyalties). Many officers now 
fear that the army is being purged along ethnic lines, with hundreds 
arrested already. This threat may inspire Tutsi soldiers, who have so far 
remained aloof from the country’s political turmoil, to abandon their 
neutrality. If that happens, and the military splits violently along ethnic 
lines, a far worse conflict could erupt.32
Assisting Reform
For many African countries, military reform is thus necessary to 
achieve stable democratic institutions over the long-term. Militaries 
must be insulated from political tampering, whether personally or ethni-
cally motivated. Existing ethnic armies must also be restructured such 
that soldiers are no longer recruited and promoted based on their ethnic 
identity. Only then can power be safety transferred between elected 
leaders without the constant danger of military intervention. Nationally 
representative armies may also assist in better constraining chief execu-
tives within their constitutional limits, thus averting other forms of 
autocratic regression. 
What is needed is the proliferation and entrenchment of merit-based 
military institutions. Once well established, systems of merit-based 
recruitment and promotion insulate soldiers from purges, demotions, 
and other negative outcomes due to their ethnic identity or political 
leanings. Soldiers then have less reason to fear personal consequences 
resulting from social unrest or democratic rotations of power, thereby 
lessening military resistance to democratization and increasing their 
political neutrality. 
The United States and other international actors can assist with such 
reform in three key ways. First, reform can threaten existing armies and 
destabilize regimes in the short term. The on-the-ground presence of 
neutral foreign troops or advisors can dampen fears, ensure fairness, 
and even shield struggling civilian governments from coup attempts 
31      See, respectively, William J. Foltz and Steve McDonald, eds., Democratization in Africa: The 
Role of  the Military (Report on the Second Regional Conference) (Cotonou, Benin: The African-American 
Institute, 1995); Osman Gbla, “Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone,” 
International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 (March 2006): 83; and Gavin Cawthra, “Security Transformation 
in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, eds., Governing Insecurity: 
Democratic Control of  Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies (London: Zed Books, 
2003), 32-38.
32      “Burundi Crisis Spreads Outside the Capital; Army ‘Purge’ Underway Following Failed 
Coup,” Mail and Guardian, June 6, 2015; and “Burundi: What Is Behind the Coup Bid?” BBC, May 
15, 2015.
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during restructuring. Second, security sector reform programs and 
military-to-military exchange and training programs can offer direct 
assistance in developing and implementing merit-based recruitment and 
promotion systems. Finally, financial incentives could be used to reward 
African governments for maintaining such systems. Of course, these 
measures are no panacea and cannot substitute for a domestic willing-
ness to grapple with reform. But we can reward, assist, and even protect 
those African governments who are trying to build a better democratic 
future for their country.
Protective Boots on the Ground
Dismantling existing patronage networks, ethnic or otherwise, 
within the military directly threatens officers with the capacity to vio-
lently halt reform efforts. Soldiers may fear they will be unable to meet 
meritocratic standards. Or they may fear democratic reforms merely 
provide a palatable cover for displacing current officers in favor of 
another political or ethnic network. In either case, the existing army may 
resist restructuring, creating the very instability such reform ultimately 
seeks to prevent.
AFRICOM, working with other regional and international actors, 
could play a pivotal role in helping governments to overcome these short-
term challenges and implement reforms by putting boots on the ground. 
The most precarious period of restructuring is the initial transition from 
ethnic (or political) loyalty to meritocratic recruitment and promotion 
policies. During this time, fears may run high as new systems quickly 
replace old practices and previously excluded groups have entered the 
military in significant but small numbers, posing a threat to the existing 
dominant group but still easily sidelined or purged. The presence of 
ground troops or military advisors can dampen fears and shield civilian 
governments as this initial restructuring takes place. Just as in the after-
math of civil wars, foreign personnel are neutral to existing conflicts and 
can pass reliable information to all sides about compliance with regu-
lations, rumored troop movements, and other indicators of defection 
from, or cooperation with, the new system. They can thus reduce fear 
and uncertainty and prevent accidents from spiraling out of control.33 
Foreign troops or advisors can also act as early warning systems for coup 
plots by monitoring military movements, thereby discouraging hard-
liners from violent resistance to reforms. Such monitoring takes away 
from any planned attack the elements of stealth and surprise—which 
are crucial to successful coup attempts. 
Yet, sending significant numbers of military personnel in support of 
reform, even advisors, would encounter serious obstacles. Placing troops 
on the ground relies on both the willingness of the host country to 
accept foreign military personnel, and the willingness of external actors 
to supply them. In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the United States has been hesitant to put boots on the ground, even 
in small numbers—although sending advisors may be a more palatable 
option. Even AFRICOM’s ability to send advising and training per-
sonnel is limited. Under the Army’s Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) 
33      For a discussion of  peacekeepers as neutral forces in the aftermath of  civil wars, see Virginia 
Paige Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 93-98.
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concept, a brigade has been attached to AFRICOM since 2013. Teams 
can be deployed in support of training missions, but they are generally 
short missions involving small numbers of personnel.34 Equally impor-
tant, the African Union has long emphasized finding “African solutions 
to African problems” and the common stance of the vast majority of 
African countries is to discourage hosting foreign troops. Stationing 
combat troops, or even large advising teams, on African soil could 
thus seriously damage perceptions of, and support for, AFRICOM.35 
Whether small advising teams could deter or prevent determined mili-
tary opposition to reform remains an open question. 
Training in Support of Merit
Even where reforming democracies cannot be directly protected, 
training assistance is still vital to their success. For countries that have 
long operated by other norms, creating and maintaining systems of merit 
based recruitment and promotion is neither intuitive nor easy. To ensure 
that officer recruitment and promotions are based on merit rather than 
political or ethnic loyalty, military academies and advanced staff colleges 
may need to be established, restructured, expanded, or their curricula 
overhauled, to tie advancement in the ranks to continuing education. 
Decisions must be made over the qualities and achievements militaries 
seek to reward for each rank and career track and then performance 
indicators, promotion criteria, pay scales, entrance and advancement 
tests, and other incentives designed on that basis. And both civilian 
and military personnel must be trained to administer and continually 
improve such systems. Well versed in these procedures, the US military 
can offer critical assistance to fledgling democracies in the process of 
building them. 
The United States could tie such training into existing programs. 
First, AFRICOM, working with the State Department, is currently 
extensively involved in training partner nations to enhance their 
own long-term ability to provide security. The Africa Contingency 
Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, part of the 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), has already partnered with 
25 African countries to train over 77,000 African peacekeepers. In the 
last few years, the program has shifted away from direct training and 
toward enhancing local training infrastructures.36 Similarly, Operation 
Juniper Shield has trained company-sized forces from 10 African 
nations in the trans-Sahel to increase border security and counter the 
illicit flow of people, goods, and arms across the region.37 These existing 
advisory teams could assist in expanding military education programs to 
prepare soldiers for merit-based promotion protocols and help develop 
performance indicators and promotion criteria while deployed on 
missions. Second, International Military Education Training (IMET) 
and Expanded International Military Education Training (E-IMET) 
programs already focus on human rights, military professionalization, 
34      David E. Brown, AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of  a New US Combatant Command 
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 77-78.
35      Ibid., 57, 62; and Gorm Rye Olsen, “Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy: The USA and 
the European Union in Somalia and Mali,” European Security 23, no. 3 (2014): 291.
36      US Department of  State, “Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI),” http://www.state.
gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi.
37      Brown, AFRICOM at 5 Years, 34.
22        Parameters 45(2) Summer 2015
understanding civilian control of the military, and judicial reform.38 
Building merit-based systems seems a natural extension to this impor-
tant work. Finally, AFRICOM has also participated in Security Sector 
Reform programs that involve more extensive restructuring of secu-
rity forces, especially after civil wars. Operation Onward Liberty, for 
example, saw 50-60 uniformed military advisors sent to Liberia to assist 
with reform.39 In such cases, a rare opportunity exists to rebuild the 
defense sector almost from the ground-up and measures that promote 
merit could be folded into existing security sector reform efforts.
Increasing the US training role during military reform efforts would, 
moreover, align well with existing strategy in the region. AFRICOM’s 
priority is to “lead from behind”: building partner capacity and prevent-
ing conflict while enabling African nations to solve their own security 
concerns.40 Increased military-to-military exchanges would hopefully 
strengthen partnerships between US and African forces while creating 
more robust and stable local military institutions and civil-military rela-
tions over the long-term.
Financial Incentives
Finally, external actors can develop financial incentives that 
reward African countries for establishing merit based recruitment and 
promotion systems and dissuade their dismantlement. Military aid, or 
broader forms of development aid, can be tied directly to maintaining 
meritocratic and politically neutral security institutions. Of course, the 
United States gives military aid for a variety of reasons—including for 
counterterrorism, counter narcotics, and other strategic purposes—and 
thus may not wish to tie much of its aid package to merit-based restruc-
turing. Even bonus funds, however, for steps taken in the right direction 
might still make a difference, especially given the cash-strapped nature 
of many African states. Beyond aid, other types of rewards could include 
additional spaces in military education and exchange programs, priority 
for assignment to regional and international peacekeeping operations, 
and higher pay rates for participation in them. Such financial and pres-
tige rewards would encourage governments to begin reform efforts and 
make it costly for them to tamper with merit-based systems in the future.
Reliance on financial incentives does have its limitations. Threatening 
to withhold aid or other rewards may be largely ineffective if the threat 
itself is not credible. Militaries in strategically important countries, like 
Egypt, know that the United States is unlikely to significantly cut their 
aid. Even where aid is withheld, it can be replaced by other actors, such 
as China and Russia, with less conditionality. Making participation in 
peacekeeping operations contingent on any reform criteria would be 
difficult. Current African peacekeeping missions rely heavily on contin-
gents from autocratic and semi-autocratic countries because very few 
African nations are both democratic and willing to contribute troops.41 
Such supply deficiencies preclude placing conditions on those willing 
to participate. Finally, regimes may simply value ethnically or politically 
38      Ibid., 36.
39      Ibid., 35.
40      Ibid., 15.
41      Ibid., 80-81.
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loyal militaries more than the cost of losing any rewards offered for 
maintaining merit-based institutions.
Indeed, current policies of suspending development aid, as well 
as membership in regional organizations, in the wake of coups have 
shown meager results.42 Militaries in countries such as Guinea-Bissau 
and Niger frequently seize power, resulting in the suspension of aid, 
then schedule elections and retreat to the barracks. The international 
community quickly restores aid, and when elections fail to go their way 
or other domestic turmoil strikes, the same militaries intervene again.43 
Suspending aid in the wake of coups, given its quick restoration after a 
transition back to civilian rule, thus seems to discourage militaries from 
governing but not from intervening in politics.
Nonetheless, financial rewards cannot hurt and they may marginally 
shift the incentives facing local civilian and military actors such that 
they support and maintain reforms.
Conclusion
Military intervention has been a key stumbling block preventing 
democratic consolidation in Africa. Political tampering by African 
leaders with military recruitment, retention, and promotion practices 
fuels such intervention. Political tampering has motivated officers to 
abandon their neutrality and forestall the consolidation of fledgling 
democracies. Africa’s legacy of ethnically recruited militaries has also 
been a pernicious destabilizing force. Africa’s diversity means that elec-
tions will bring to power leaders who no longer share the identity of 
historically constructed ethnic armies. Threatened with restructuring 
and diversification, these ethnic armies may act drastically to avoid 
losing their privileged access to an important source of state power and 
patronage; they have halted elections, engaged in voter intimidation and 
ballot fraud, annulled results, and overthrown the government.
Deepening democracy in many African countries thus requires 
dismantling established ethnic armies, reforming militaries along meri-
tocratic lines, and insulating them from political tampering. Not only is 
such restructuring normatively desirable in meeting standards of justice 
wherein every citizen, regardless of their ethnic identity, should be able 
to serve their country with honor, but it is essential for truly demo-
cratic politics. Elected state leaders should hail from any and all social 
groups—without destabilizing the state. 
42      International organizations, such as the World Bank, regional organizations, and individual 
countries have all practiced suspending aid and diplomatic relations after military coups. The United 
States is required to suspend aid under the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, as they have done in cases 
like Mali, as well as to cease any security assistance to a military that has seized power (Ham, Senate 
Armed Services Committee Statement, 10; and Monika Mark, “US Suspends Mali’s Military Aid After 
Coup,” The Guardian, March 26, 2012). The European Union considers cases on an individual basis 
but has at least partially suspended aid and cooperation in the past (Mark Anderson, “EU Restores 
Ties with Guinea-Bissau Five Years After Coup,” The Guardian, March 25, 2015). And the African 
Union censures members, suspends their membership, and even applies sanctions after coups (see 
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An Empirical Assessment,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of  the Southern Political Science 
Association (New Orleans, LA, January 12, 2012). 
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Diversifying African militaries may have several other beneficial 
effects. First, if reliance on an ethnically narrow army emboldens leaders 
to engage in repressive behavior they might otherwise think twice 
about—from intimidating opposition parties and other ethnic groups 
to ignoring legislation and judicial rulings—then decreasing that reli-
ance may force leaders to moderate their behavior. Second, practices of 
ethnic exclusion are known to feed rebellion and ethnic insurgencies. 
Improving Africa’s record of ethnic inclusion in a critical state institution 
could have long-term ameliorative effects on instability in the region.
Yet, the necessary reforms toward merit-based military institutions 
will likely exacerbate the very problem they seek to solve. Ethnic armies 
are unlikely to acquiesce quietly to their own dismantling. This is where 
the United States and its allies can play a vital role in assisting and even 
protecting reform-minded governments. Troops or advisors on the 
ground can provide neutral information on compliance and deter coup 
attempts through monitoring. Training assistance can help governments 
with the practicalities of establishing and maintaining merit-based 
recruitment and promotion systems. And financial incentives can be 
structured to discourage eroding the new systems. For example, military 
or development aid, places in military-to-military exchange programs, 
and bonus pay for peacekeepers could be tied to maintaining merit-
centered security forces. 
These measures can not provide a panacea for domestic problems 
and they cannot overcome stiff resistance from leaders long accustomed 
to recruiting their militaries from amongst their own coethnics or 
otherwise politically tampering with the army. Moreover, even if estab-
lished, protecting merit-based recruitment and promotion systems over 
time will be an even more difficult challenge. Indeed, the long-term 
entrenchment of merit-based military institutions relies on reforms in 
other areas of governance. The rule of law and the development of leg-
islative and judicial constraints on executive power are both necessary 
to prevent presidents facing insecure environments, and the potential 
of divisive internal conflict, from tampering with merit-based militaries 
and returning to well-established practices of building security insti-
tutions around political or ethnic loyalty. International assistance and 
incentives to continue moving in the right direction can help, but success 
will ultimately rest on a general evolution of domestic political practices 
toward democracy, the rule of law, and civilian control over the military. 
This is a struggle that must, in the end, be fought domestically—but we 
can and should protect and reward reformers.
